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Introduction 
 
Contrary to the so-called “hard” sciences, the role of subjectivity in the 
constitution of scientific discourse is out in the open in the humanities. Much 
of the quintessential theoretical discussions on what the humanities should or 
should not do have been on the role of subjectivity, the parts that social, 
economical, ideological and cultural agendas and backgrounds play in the 
constitution of knowledge. These discussions were held under the banner of 
“the problem of values” in the humanities, and they have taken a central 
place in theoretical discussions within the humanities and the social sciences, 
in particular since Max Weber’s famous (and often misunderstood as 
positivistic) plea for a “value-free” social science. (Weber 1982). How it is 
exactly that values play a constitutive role in the creation of scientific 
knowledge is an ongoing debate. I will not try to contribute to this discussion 
in itself. Rather, what I would like to do, is to pose the (transcendental)  
question of the conditions of possibility of this discussion itself. How is it 
possible that we discuss values as being a part of science? Where did we get 
the idea that values are constitutive for scientific knowledge, and where does 
the idea come from that discussions on this topic can be fruitful for scientific 
knowledge? In this paper, I will try to find out what is presupposed by the 
fact that we grant such an amount of importance to the constitutive role of 
values in the humanities. The answer is, I believe, a specific conception of 
the other as a subject articulated both in terms of Kant’s theory of the subject 
and Herder’s theory of the subject. 
The problem of the role of values in the humanities is a consequence of 
the emergence of the other as a source of intellectual consideration.  In order 
to make this point, however, I will first clarify what I mean by the term  
“The Other”.  
If we take the term “The Other” in a broad sense, merely as referring to 
persons different from ourselves, then there have always been others and 
there always will be others. The ability of humans to communicate is based 
on the presupposition that there are other people. In this paper, however, I 
will use the term as it is interpreted by Emmanuel Levinas. According to 
Levinas, the other is not merely a different person. Levinas often refers to 
the other as a stranger. (for example Levinas 1971 parts 1A2 & 1B5, Levinas 
1978 II4f) He differs from the persons in our every-day environment, he has 
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a sort of aura of strangeness, he breaks to our everyday routine and by doing 
so puts this routine into question. Nevertheless, the other is not unsettling 
simply because he is different, but most importantly because he exerts an 
ethical appeal towards us. The other summons us, through the appeal of his 
face, to take him in, to feed him, to recognize his needs and to listen to what 
he has to say. In sum two points are essential here. The first is the 
strangeness of the other, the second is the recognition of the other, someone 
whose needs are relevant and whose opinions have to been taken into 
account somehow. 
I agree with Levinas that “The other” in this sense is still a universal 
category of human existence, and as such it is present throughout cultures 
and civilizations. Nevertheless, I believe it has been present merely on the 
level of the individual. Only quite recently has it turned up in more general 
political and scientific discourse. According to Reinhart Koselleck, the 
decisive moment is the so-called Sattelzeit, more or less from 1750 to 1850. 
(Koselleck 2004, p 240) What was decisive about this point was the arrival 
of the revolutionary consciousness, the idea, for the first time in history, that 
the future could be made into something radically different from the present. 
In the slipstream of this point, the idea arose that the past might have been 
very different as well. And from the idea that the past was very different, in 
combination with the colonial expansions, the idea arose that not only the 
past may have been different, but that there are fundamentally different 
people living in the present as well. An important fact here is that this means 
that the temporal other is prior to the spatial other as present in 
anthropology. This is clear by the fact that the scientific discourse involved 
in the origin of anthropology was primarily temporal. Exotic people were 
seen as studied not in the first place as others per se, but as examples of 
earlier stages of the development of Western civilization. (see Fabian 1983) 
In short, the anthropological other is therefore derived from the historical 
other. 
Now, let us return to the problem of values. There would be no need for 
a discussion on the constitutive role of values in the humanities if there were 
no people with values which are different from our own, since our values 
would then be taken for granted and not put into question. So if we have a 
discussion on the role of values as a theoretical foundation for the 
humanities, this requires a theoretical account of how other people can hold 
other values as a precondition. And this in its turn requires an account of the 
other in the sense of Levinas, not as simply a different person, but as 
someone who intrudes in our every-day routine, someone who brings an 
element of difference in the daily life-world. As we have seen, such an 
account only became possible in the course of the nineteenth century. 
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Kant & Herder 
 
However, the emergence of the idea of the other as culturally other is not 
enough in itself. There is something more, and in the following pages, I will 
try to show that this “something more” is the Kantian conception of the 
subject. As a first step in this process, let us take a look at the different ways 
in which Kant and Herder have written about the turn to the subject in 
philosophy. We all know Kant’s famous words: 
"Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; 
but all attempts to find out something about them a priori through concepts that 
would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence 
let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by 
assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition, which would agree better 
with the requested possibility of an a priori cognition of them, which is to establish 
something about objects before they are given to us. This would be just like the 
first thoughts of Copernicus, who, when he did not make good progress in the 
explanation of the celestial movements if he assumed that the entire celestial host 
revolves around the observer, tried to see if he might not have greater success if he 
made the observer revolve and left the stars at rest." (B XVI, Kant 2005) 
Now let us compare these with Herder’s view on the Copernican Revolution 
in philosophy 
"All philosophy, if it is going to be of the people, must render the people the 
central point, and if one alters the point of view of philosophy in such a way, as the 
Copernican system merged from the Ptolemaic, what new fruitful developments 
would have to appear, once our entire philosophy becomes Anthropology." 
(Herder, quoted in Denby 2005) 
As we can see, Kant and Herder both make a plea for a subjective turn in 
philosophy, but for very different reasons. Kant’s motivation is a lack of 
good explanations for the objective features of science, ethics, and nature 
from traditional old-school philosophy. His motivation is an argument from 
within philosophy itself, so to speak. Herder, however, offers a very different 
argument. He turns away from traditional dogmatic metaphysics because he 
wants a philosophy for the people. What is wrong with traditional 
Schulphilosophie is not that it is inconsistent or that it does not offer good 
explanations, but that it is unethical: it is undemocratic and does not have a 
practical agenda. It is not of the people and for the people. For Herder, 
philosophy should be about the practical lives of the people, and for Herder,  
“practical” entails “contingent”, since the practical needs of the people are 
related to their contingent natural and cultural surroundings. Herder’s 
objection is therefore a principal one, aimed against the very idea of a 
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universalist philosophy, which is in itself unethical. What is important for us, 
is that while both Herder and Kant plead for a turn towards subjectivity, for 
Herder this is also a turn towards contingency, while for Kant this is not 
necessarily the case. Kant just wants to answer the old universalistic 
questions of pre-critical philosophy in a new way. It is indeed true that the 
contingent has a special place in Kant’s philosophy, in particular in his 
account of the moral, life and the sublime. Nevertheless, these moments of 
contingency were never a prime motivation. Kant tries to find universal  
answers to the old universalistic questions, and it is only through the posing 
of these questions that the contingent turns up. Kant, being the great 
philosopher he is, does not try to ignore it or reason it away, but gives it a 
very determinate place in his philosophical system. Nevertheless, the 
contingent as such has never been the main focus of the Kantian 
philosophical system, which stands in sharp contrast with what Herder has 
done. 
As is quite commonly known, Herder was the first philosopher to make 
cultural differences the foundation of a way of thinking. In this sense, Herder 
can, much more than Kant, be said to be a forerunner of the humanities as 
scientific disciplines, understood as the scientific study of the other as a 
cultural other. One would then also expect that Herder more than Kant could 
form the basis for the problematic role of values in constructing scientific 
objectivity, since he stresses the importance of cultural differences in such a 
strong way, both in science and with respect to values, much more than Kant 
does. Nevertheless, the philosophers who have laid the foundations for the 
philosophy (or philosophies) of the humanities, people such as Rickert, 
Dilthey and Weber, were neo-Kantians. Why is this so? 
Let us think for a moment about the discussion about values as 
constitutive for objectivity in the humanities. If this discussion is so 
important, it is because the stakes are high. It matters whether or not we 
bring this discussion to a good end. If we were to be clear on what we should 
do with our subjectivity in order to achieve objective knowledge of our 
fellow human beings, this would mean that the way is open for a much better 
understanding of the society we live in. And in order to do this, in order to 
believe that the humanities and social sciences are important in themselves 
and that understanding the part of subjectivity is the key to put these 
disciplines on the sure and steady path of objective science, there is an 
essential precondition which has to be present; namely that we have the 
ability to change our values. 
Imagine for a moment that we would discover that objectivity is 
constituted by values, but that we can never change our values. This might 
be interesting in itself, but it can never be unsettling or revolutionary. The 
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only thing we can do with it, is to feel awe or repulsion, and there it stops. 
The way Herder describes the values of the other is precisely this. For 
example, Herder states that the way of life of a European musical virtuoso or 
an North-African shepherd is of equal value but radically different. (Denby 
2005 p 59) As long, however, as there is no possibility for the virtuoso to 
become a shepherd or the shepherd to become a virtuoso, this will remain a 
mere observation. In Herder’s account, therefore, there is no reason why the 
discussion on values would take a central place in the philosophy of the 
humanities.  
If, on the other hand, we presuppose that we can change our values, 
then the realization that values are constitutive for knowledge is very striking 
and unsettling, because it can affect our own lives, for example the very 
fundament of how we think of scientific objectivity. Therefore, the fact that 
the discussion on the constitutive role of values is important in the 
philosophy of the humanities presupposes that we can change our values. 
We have already seen that it is not enough to discover that there are other 
people with other values. What then do we have to presuppose further if we 
want to grant the other the possibility of having a fundamental influence on 
us?  
The answer is the following: if we want to grant the other the possibility 
of influencing us, we have to consider the other not merely as the other, but 
as an alter ego, a different version of ourselves. This implies two things: first 
some kind of basic structure that we share with the other, and second, 
something essentially alien about the other, something which is 
incommensurable with our own understanding of life. If we want to open up 
the possibility of being influenced by the other, we have to presuppose that 
some of the projects of our life are similar to the projects of the other. We 
have to presuppose that the other is engaged in the same project as we are. 
Only in this way, by realizing that there might be other ways of living our 
life, can the other really influence us. In other words, we have to presuppose 
that both we and the other strive towards a similar goal, but that this happens 
from different points of view, which are essentially contingent and therefore 
changeable. More specifically, what we believe to have in common with the 
other marks out the terrain on which the other can influence us. So, in the 
case of objectivity, we first have to presuppose that the other might have a 
different kind of objectivity, or a different method of attaining objectivity, in 
order to let the other influence our idea of objective knowledge. In more 
general terms, we have to presuppose a universal horizon in which the events 
of contingency can take place.  All of this has a very interesting paradox as a 
consequence. The other cannot stand in a relation of otherness towards us 
precisely if he is too much the other, i.e. if there is no shared general or 
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universal horizon which serves as a condition of possibility for my relation 
with the other. To put it somewhat sloganesque: the absolute other can never 
be the other. We can only account for the phenomenon of the other if we 
take the other to be not completely other in the ontological sense. 
 
 
Kant & the other 
 
Now, in order to develop such a concept of the alter ego in which the 
same and the other are combined, we need the Kantian account of the 
relation between subjectivity and objectivity. What Kantian critical 
philosophy does, is exactly what we need here: it gives us an account on how 
universal principles relate to a contingent perspective, which, because it is 
contingent, can be alien to us. But this Kantian account is not sufficient in 
itself. Kant derives the objective principles of knowledge, ethics, arts and 
nature by abstracting from the specific character of the contingency from the 
part of the subject. So although contingency is a necessary premise for any 
kind of objective principle, it is no longer incorporated in a substantial way 
in these objective principles themselves, only formally. In the Kantian 
perspective, the only thing that matters is that we take a contingent point of 
view, but it does not matter at all what this point of view consists of. 
In fact, concerning the other, we cannot say that the other is a different 
version of ourselves. We can merely say that the other is similar to 
ourselves, but that this similarity is hidden behind a veil of contingency. I 
believe it is quite right to say that this is the dominant view of what it is to be 
human in the Western world, both in the general public and media as in the 
scientific study of human nature. In “the Interpretation of Cultures”, Clifford 
Geertz formulated this, following Arthur Lovejoy, as the opinion that human 
society really is a stage play. All the actors are in principle the same and 
interchangeable, but they put on different costumes as they appear on the 
world stage. (Geertz 1973, p 34) I believe this opinion is, sadly, still 
prevalent in our common-sense thought about culture.  
So we will not find an account of the other, defined in the sense we 
described above, in Kant. Therefore, Herder and the tradition of historicism 
come back in. It was only after Kant and Herder that the intellectual world 
realized that contingent historical factors might be essential for both nature 
and man, that the essence of nature and of man might consist of the fact that 
there is no timeless essence. As we have seen, taken in itself, this statement 
does not lead to much result, besides maybe a stronger form of exotism. But 
taken together with the Kantian claim on the constitutive role of subjectivity, 
it has a much stronger potential. By making the role of the historically and 
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culturally contingent more important in Kantian critical philosophy, it 
becomes possible to create an account of the other as alter ego, as a subject 
which is equally contingent as it is universal. On the one hand, because 
Rickert, Dilthey, Cassirer, Weber and the other neo-kantians were neo-
kantians, they still presupposed some kind of universality about the subject. 
On the other hand, because they have written after the century of historicism, 
so after Herder and Hegel, but also after Ranke, Burckhardt, Lyell and 
Darwin, they can no longer state that there are timeless absolute qualities 
about this subjectivity as it is in itself, regardless of its cultural environment. 
Therefore, their conclusion inevitably results in the statement that objective 
and seemingly timeless categories are always grounded on a contingent and 
dynamic point of view and vice versa, that we need timeless categories to 
give contingent and alien properties of the subject their full importance. 
Of course, this is only the beginning. The question of how the 
contingent and the universal accounts of subjectivity are related to each other 
is still unanswered. In fact, the challenge for any post-Kantian and post-
historicist philosopher of the humanities becomes even stronger than the 
challenge Kant put before himself. Instead of deriving objective and 
universal concepts from subjectivity, they are set before the task of 
explaining how objective and universal concepts result from a seemingly 
paradoxical subjectivity, a subjectivity which is both contingent and 
universal. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is from this context, a necessary combination, one could say, of 
Herder and Kant, that the discussion on the role of values in the humanities, 
which has been so important in twentieth century philosophy, could 
originate. One can read large parts of the philosophy of the humanities, and 
even of philosophy of science in general, of the twentieth century as a series 
of answers different philosophers have given to this challenge. Ernst 
Cassirer, for example, made a distinction between the quality and the 
modality of universal concepts such as causation, space, time, substance, 
property, etc, the quality being a trans-cultural universal property and the 
modality a specific and contingent instantiation. (Cassirer 1970  pp 95-96.) 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, to give another example, has stated that culturally 
contingent values or prejudices serve as a starting point, and objective truth 
as an ideal. (Gadamer 2004, see pp 277-304) The movement between the 
two then is the process of hermeneutic understanding, or in other words, 
dialogue. All of these theories of post-Kantian philosophers  share, I believe, 
one basic common trait. They all believe that objective knowledge is 
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founded on a subjectivist contingent basis, but they also believe that it 
cannot merely be reduced to that contingent basis. They are all of the 
opinion that there is also something universal about the subject by means of 
which changes in its contingent aspect are possible. Nevertheless, and this is 
the difference with Kant himself, they do not believe that this contingent 
aspect can be treated in a purely formal  and abstract way. 
What I have argued now is that this is possible because they are post-
Kantians: they believe that there is something universal which opens up the 
background, a “playing field” or a “plane of communication”, so to speak, 
on the basis of which a critique or a change of this contingent situation is 
possible. If there were no such “playing field”, such as in Herder’s 
philosophy, there would be no discussion about values, since values would 
then be seen as a natural given which we cannot change. If, however, the 
universal aspect of subjectivity would be the only one, such as in Kant’s 
account, there would be no discussion as well, since values would not be 
essential to knowledge. They would just serve as a mere byproduct of the 
subject, as a necessary bother which is best kept out of scientific enquiry. 
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